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f A C u L t y  v i e W s
The following is an extract from the statement delivered by 
Michigan Law School Professor Nicholas Howson at the 
inaugural “China-U.S. Rule of Law Dialogue” held at Beijing’s 
Tsinghua University July 29-30, 2010, and convened by Tsinghua 
Law Dean Wang Zhenmin and Harvard Law School Professor and 
East Asian Legal Studies Director William Alford, and with the 
support of the China-United States Exchange Foundation chaired 
by C.H. Tung, first chief executive and president of the Executive 
Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The 
dialogue was organized as a private meeting between senior PRC 
law professors and U.S.-based Chinese law specialists to discuss 
China’s three decades-long legal reform program and progress 
towards “rule of law” in the People’s Republic of China in all 
areas of the domestic legal system.
Recently I have spent a significant amount of time studying 
Chinese People’s Court judicial opinions in the corporate law and 
securities regulation areas, and have come across examples of 
extremely competent judicial work by the People’s Courts at all 
levels. This in turn has pushed me to reconsider the goals and 
trajectory of “judicial reform” outside of the usual focus—the 
“vertical” social control/criminal law function—but still in the 
broader context of China’s movement towards “rule of law” and a 
desired “rule of law state.”
Admittedly, it is the judicial function in the social control/criminal 
law areas which attracts the most attention from Chinese and 
foreign legal scholars and journalists—e.g., with respect to 
judicial constitutional review, administrative law and review, 
criminal law and criminal procedure, or mass torts that threaten 
to conjure group political action and social instability. That focus 
is entirely appropriate, for what we loosely understand as judicial 
independence (against superior political or military power) and 
the autonomy of the law (against political commands or shifting 
policy, and as contrasted with raw instrumentalism) must be at 
the core of anyone’s conception of rule of law. At the same time, 
however, we must understand that the majority of the PRC 
citizenry intersects with law and legal institutions “horizontally” 
and at the apparently more mundane level of property and 
contracts rights and expectations.  
As scholars intent on understanding the development of “rule of 
law” in contemporary China, we cannot therefore ignore entirely 
how legal institutions function, day to day, in the corporate/
commercial/contract/property rights spheres, and most 
importantly how they are perceived to function by civil actors 
who have recourse to the same institutions for the settlement of 
disputes, clarification of property and contract rights, and 
enforcement of those rights—at least against other, horizontally 
positioned, actors. Indeed, many of the rights described and 
enforced in the commercial sphere—e.g., residential and 
commercial real estate, intellectual property, labor contracting, 
family property, media and publication, etc.—may presently or in 
the future be asserted against institutions which have that 
present monopoly on political or coercive power. These claims 
may thus be seen as embryonic identities of the more sensitive 
civil and political rights understood to be at the core of “rule of 
law.” 
Let me be more concrete by citing two examples of what I think is 
highly competent adjudication in contemporary China, culled 
from publicly available judicial opinions. These examples, two 
among thousands, will never be described in the pages of 
Nanfang Zhoumo [Southern Weekend], Caixin Magazine, the 
New York Times, or Le Monde. Yet they reveal commendable 
judicial action that is relatively common, and distinct from the 
always fascinating stories of lack of judicial independence, 
official corruption, summary procedure, coercive use of the legal 
system and more that feature in the Chinese and foreign media.  
A first case arose in Shanghai Municipality’s relatively distant 
Baoshan District.1 In the opinion, the Shanghai Baoshan District 
People’s Court (later upheld by the Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate 
People’s Court) looked through a de jure “corporate” establishment 
to understand a de facto “partnership” and to rule on the investing 
participants’ rights accordingly. Disregarding form (and an 
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1Zhang Qingzhao v. Zhang Wenhu, Shanghai Baoshan District People’s Court (2002); upheld on 
appeal Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court (2004). Reproduced in Supreme People’s 
Court China Practical Jurisprudence Research Institute, ed., 55:1 RENMIN FAYUAN ANLI 
XUAN (2006), pp. 234-41.
Professor Howson addresses the Rule of Law Dialogue in Bejiing, with 
Harvard Law Professor William Alford, the late Professor Betty Ho of the 
University of Toronto and Tsinghua University (and a former visiting  






















f A C u L t y  v i e W s
apparent Shareholders’ Agreement between the investors), the 
Baoshan court ruled that the entity at the center of the dispute 
was a kind of general partnership and ordered equal partner 
distributions of the enterprise’s residual assets (instead of 
different proportions of the company’s residual assets determined 
by the participants’ notional “equity” investment). The Baoshan 
Court did not base its ruling on the imperfect PRC Partnership 
Enterprise Law or any other positive law, but what are understood 
to be universal partnership law principles: Unless subject to ex 
ante contract, partners share in the residual assets of the 
partnership equally, regardless of their investment or contribution 
to the partnership. This decision demonstrates a very high level of 
technical insight and competence, which even many U.S. state 
courts struggling to adjudicate close corporations might have had 
difficulty implementing.
A second case comes from the city of Zhengzhou in Henan 
Province,2 where the shareholder of a property development 
company was permitted to initiate a derivative suit against a 
contractor that had not performed on a construction contract 
entered into with company. The problem in the case, for the 
initiating plaintiff at least, was that the complaining shareholder 
had not formally served the requisite demand on, or met with 
refusal from, the development company (the true party in interest 
in the derivative action) in conformity with Article 152 of China’s 
2006 Company Law. The defendant and non-performing 
construction contractor offered as one defense that “the plaintiff 
has not exhausted all internal remedies in accordance with legal 
stipulations,” referring to the lack of required demand or refusal. 
However, both the Zhengzhou Municipal Guancheng Hui 
Minority District People’s Court and the Zhengzhou Intermediate 
People’s Court on appeal permitted the derivative action to go 
forward by taking judicial notice of that fact that originally the 
company did sue on the contract, but then withdrew its action 
(under the power, no doubt, of the breaching or simply conflicted 
fiduciary) at the time of the lower court proceedings. This allowed 
both courts to rule that (in the words of the appellate Intermediate 
People’s Court opinion) “this may be seen as the same thing as a 
refusal [by the company] to bring the action.” This elegant 
adjudication allowed the plaintiff and the courts to continue with 
the derivative action for contract enforcement even in the absence 
of legally required demand and refusal—a technical non-
conformity which more timid or less autonomous courts would 
have invoked as a basis to deny the entire claim. 
In these two cases we see something which might be considered 
extraordinary in the PRC context:  technical competence certainly, 
but also the ability of Chinese judicial institutions to go beyond the 
bounds of formal statute in crafting a legal characterization and 
applying doctrine that vindicates important legal rights in a highly 
sophisticated and justice-facilitating way.
Tom Ginsburg and Timira Moustafa have identified five primary 
functions for judicial institutions in authoritarian political systems: 
(i) social control and the containment of political opposition; (ii) 
bolstering government “legitimacy”; (iii) support of administrative 
compliance and coordination of competing functions; (iv) 
facilitation of trade and investment; and (v) the provision of cover 
for controversial policies.  I understand the Ginsburg-Moustafa list 
as somewhat partial and pessimistic. In fact, judicial institutions 
in non-democratic or authoritarian societies do much more than 
erect a Potemkin Village of purely symbolic decision-making and 
convenient cover for oppressive political organization. This is 
especially true as even politically unreconstructed societies 
experience economic system transformation, putting property and 
contract rights into the hands of low-level civil actors: contract 
parties, residential property owners, shareholders, inheritance 
beneficiaries, copyright owners, etc. One proof of this is the 
degree to which citizens in China with no particular political 
background, or assurance of a politically determined result, 
continue to refer to “law” and formal judicial institutions for 
remedies. We saw this in the strong appetite among individual 
shareholders for remedies against false or misleading disclosure 
in the securities markets between 1999 (after promulgation of the 
form of China’s first Securities Law) and 2003 (when the Supreme 
People’s Court permitted a limited private right of action against 
issuers, controlling shareholders, underwriters and accountants in 
such cases), and widely publicized cases discussed in the very 
independent PRC financial press. Aggrieved investors continued to 
push into the People’s Courts, in many cases knowing that the 
defendants were actors with superior political and economic 
power in Chinese society (not to mention significant power over 
the judges in their locale). The fact that state institutions have 
sought to limit this recourse—for instance, by excluding claims 
against insider trading and securities manipulation, splitting large 
plaintiff groups into smaller groups, restricting contingency fee 
arrangements, or continuing to resist the introduction of the 
class action mechanism—does not dilute the certainty of 
demand-side interest in recourse to formal judicial institutions 
in contemporary China.   
The critiques leveled against China’s judicial institutions both in 
China and from abroad are many. These criticisms include: lack of 
technical competence; constrained political independence and the 
burden of Party Committees; funding of local level courts—and 
thus direct political control—by local level government (and Party) 
institutions; direction from adjudication committees; the inability 
2Lu Tong v. Henan Longxiang Construction Engineering Company Limited, In re: Henan Golden 
Mango Property Company Limited, Zhengzhou Municipal Guancheng Hui Minority District 
People’s Court (2007) guan min er chu zi No. 257; upheld on appeal Henan Provincial 






















to act against local government (Party) power to enforce civil 
rights and interests (not to mention central law or policy); relative 
powerlessness against the police, secret police and military; 
understaffing and over-stretched resources; procedural 
irregularities and confusion (including endless appeals and “black 
holes,” and failure to deliver resolution, compensation or any idea 
of “justice”); unrestrained and judgment-determining ex parte 
contacts; the continuing failure to hold public proceedings; 
corruption; lower courts seeking guidance from bureaucratically 
higher-level courts prior to decision; court officials working 
towards bureaucratic quota of “case handling” (case disposition) 
rather than substantive case-specific adjudication; refusal to 
accept cases that involve a large number of parties (triggering 
“social stability” [shehui wending] concerns); the drafting of 
opinions prior to submission of briefs or trial, or by court officials 
who have not attended case proceedings; enforcement “chaos” or 
impotence, etc. These specific concerns have only been augmented 
after 2007 by concern, again both Chinese and foreign, about a 
seeming shift in the rhetoric emanating from the Supreme People’s 
Court favoring a “democratic” (“masses”-friendly) judiciary, and 
attacking a “professional” (and “mystifying”) judicial apparatus.
The answers proposed—and in some cases implemented—to 
this collection of concerns tend to focus on mechanisms designed 
to enhance the People’s Courts’ technical competence, 
professionalism, transparency, procedural regularity, and political 
independence: (i) education, training, qualification and increased 
professionalization of judicial personnel; (ii) the uncoupling of 
local level courts from local governments and Party institutions, 
bureaucratically, politically and financially3 (with Supreme People’s 
Court officials advocating a federal court system with something 
like “diversity jurisdiction,” allowing for case acceptance and 
decision by disinterested judicial institutions); (iii) increased non-
political oversight, and investigation and prosecution of corruption; 
and (iv) enhanced transparency in judicial action. As scholars of 
Chinese law and judicial institutions, we must be heartened by 
and approve of all of these measures. Indeed, they are measures 
taken by societies all over the world to strengthen the performance 
and legitimacy of the single most important institution necessary 
to deliver “rule of law.” There are of course historical and political 
complexities and obstacles specifically applicable to the huge and 
widely differentiated nation we call the “People’s Republic of 
China” as it has developed to the end of the first decade of the 
second millennium. Those particular factors may counsel that we 
urge authentic and deeply rooted implementation of the above-
listed reform measures before we push too hard for really 
extraordinary changes like judicial “strict” constitutional review,4 
ever more robust judicial review of administrative action, and the 
like—favorites of Chinese legal reformers stretching back to the 
(mostly) Western-educated stalwarts of the early 20th century.  
Yet even with those specific factors in mind, let me suggest one 
other idea for continuing development of China’s reforming judicial 
institutions, and one that is inspired by my close review of judicial 
opinions in the purely commercial sphere. It is an idea slightly 
divorced from what we legal specialists usually advocate, i.e., 
substantive law reform, perfection of procedural rules, better 
financing of litigation or courts, etc. We should work to continue 
attracting “horizontal” dispute litigants into the PRC People’s 
Courts and attempt to remove obstacles, structural, substantive or 
applied, which keep those civil actors out of the courts, including 
the direction of cases to assuredly resource-efficient mediation, 
arbitration, or alternative dispute resolution. This proposed push 
has many virtues aside from those identified by institutional 
economists keen to show how predictably enforceable (and 
enforced) property rights result in economic development, and 
relates specifically to the task of constructing and reforming 
China’s judicial institutions. I am convinced that increased use of 
the People’s Courts in such cases would enhance the idea of such 
judicial institutions as the best and most authoritative forum for 
dispute resolution and property rights delineation (as opposed to 
China’s very strong pre-existing institutions such as local Party 
organizations, neighborhood committees, or family organizations). 
It would also serve the sometimes quite inchoate expectations of 
China’s population, who as noted above continue to look towards 
formal legal institutions for remedies, even against state or Party 
infringement of their rights and interests. But, and most importantly, 
increased traffic in the People’s Courts on complex matters with 
significant value at stake would give the courts themselves the 
chance to function, apply the law intelligently (and flexibly), 
demonstrate judicial independence, direct enforcement, and 
buttress their legitimacy as the critically important institution of a 
state governed “under law.” Of course, egregious mistakes will be 
made, corruption will continue to work its poison, and there will be 
vigorous resistance to increased judicial action from much stronger 
political forces. Yet China’s judicial institutions will be functioning, 
and seen to be functioning, with ever-increasing challenges to 
their competence, autonomy and political independence, and in an 
area of law and activity that does not impact directly on the 
political or social control sphere or the center of governance 
power. The hope is that if judicial institutions can establish 
themselves in this limited area, then their social power, 
effectiveness and legitimacy will extend to areas closer to the 
more sensitive core of what we perceive to be the “rule of law.”
Thank you very much.
3I note that the Politburo endorsed a proposal by the Central Political-Legal Committee to 
create central funding for all People’s Courts in November 2008 (see “Opinions of the Central 
Political-Legal Commission on Several Issues in the Deepening of Reform in the Judicial 
System and Work Mechanism”). This remains unimplemented as of this statement.   
4My idea of “strict” constitutional review is review, by a court or independent commission, of 
the conformity of legislative acts and executive action with superior norms laid out in a 
Constitution. At the present time this kind of review is not permitted under the PRC 
Constitution of 1982 (as amended), although it is allowed, in limited circumstances, under the 
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, i.e., with respect to Hong Kong 
SAR legislative norms that do not relate to the concerns of the Central People’s Government or 
the relationship between the Central People’s Government and the Hong Kong SAR. Of course, 
administrative review has been a reality in the PRC since the promulgation of the 1989 
Administrative Litigation Law.





















A conference co-organized by the U-M Law School earlier this year 
brought together a prominent contingent of experts on trade 
relations and cross-border investment between the United States 
and China who emphasized the opportunities and potential 
conflicts as China rises to a global trade and investment power.
During a keynote address, Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, 
President Clinton’s U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and the 
person who negotiated China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization spoke of increased head-to-head competition 
between developed and developing countries generally, business 
conditions in China that often are disadvantageous for foreign 
companies, and a change in the global trade and capital markets 
from U.S. dominance to a marked increase in China’s power and 
influence.
“The re-emergence of China … will be the biggest economic story 
of this century, in my opinion,” she said. “It is both a cause for 
marvel and a cause for significant global concern.”
The event, as conceived by U-M Law Professor Nicholas C. Howson 
and Wayne State University Law Professor Julia Qin, featured a 
public dialogue between the world’s top academic experts on 
trade relations between the United States and the People’s 
Republic of China, present and former government officials from 
Beijing and Washington who have been tasked with negotiating 
and implementing that important relationship, and the legal 
professionals who represent the two nations (and in some cases 




























One goal of the conference “was to focus the same high-powered 
analysis and discussion on other aspects of the economic 
relationship, including of course investment (going both ways) and 
broader systemic concerns like the economics of international 
trade and investment, climate change, the demands of the energy 
industry, the rise of the Chinese currency, and domestic judicial 
and enforcement institutions in both nations,” Howson noted.
Howson said he and Qin were pleased to have gathered some of 
the key figures involved in the U.S.-China relationship, including: 
Ambassador Barshefsky; Madame Li Yongjie, the Chinese Ministry 
of Commerce official in charge of all WTO disputes and resulting 
litigation; Tim Stratford, a former director of the China Desk at the 
U.S. Trade Representative; and Professor Merit Janow, who 
recently stepped down from the WTO's Supreme Court equivalent, 
the Appellate Body. 
In addition to Professor Howson, U-M Law School also was 
represented by Professor Edward Parson, who described the 
present state of U.S.-China climate change negotiations. Other 
U-M participants included Professor Mary Gallagher, director of 
the U-M Center for Chinese Studies; Professor Zhao Minyuan of 
the Ross Business School; and Professor Alan Deardorff of the 
U-M Economics Department, who also serves as the associate 
dean of the Ford Public Policy School. 
Progress and Pitfalls: Trade and investment 
Relations with China at Heart of Conference
